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BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 1836, as they were going about their daily business in
New Castle County, Delaware, numerous citizens were shocked and
alarmed to hear Thomas Jefferson Chandler exclaim in a loud voice,
"The Virgin Mary was a whore, and Jesus Christ was a bastard!"' The
moral outrage of the community was directed at Chandler, and he was
arrested.2 Following conviction in county court, he appealed his case to
the Delaware Court of General Sessions. The court affirmed Chandler's
conviction, and upheld the constitutionality of the crime of blasphemy.4
The court found that one who attacked the doctrines of Christianity
"struck at the foundation of. . . civil society," because "the religion of
the people of Delaware is christian."5 The court opined that the people
had a right to enjoy their chosen religion "without interruption or
1. See State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837), at *1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *14.
5. Id.at*ll.
572 [Vol. 114:2
Is HATE SPEECH BECOMING THE NEW BLASPHEMY?
disturbance," for which "they may claim the protection of law guarantied
[sic] to them by the constitution itself."6
On April 11, 2006, mourners attending the funeral of Cpl. David A.
Bass, who had been killed in Iraq while serving with the U.S. Armed
Forces, had to contend with a similar shocking outrage. Like attendants
at several other military funerals throughout the United States, they were
confronted by a band of hostile protesters. The Rev. Fred Phelps, pastor
of the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, and members of his
congregation of approximately seventy-five individuals, most of whom
are related by blood or marriage, were on hand to protest the funeral.9
They held signs proclaiming, "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" and
"Thank God for I.E.D.s," attempting to advance their message that the
United States was under divine judgment for its tolerance of
homosexuality. 0 Similar protests across the nation have been met with
varied responses. 1 The protests were branded as the actions of a hate
group by the Southern Poverty Law Center.12 Groups such as the Patriot
Guard Riders were formed to travel to funerals on an as-needed basis to
drown out Westboro's protests by standing between the protestors and
the mourners.' 3  The church's plans to protest the funerals of nine
murdered Amish girls in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, in October
2006, were abandoned when a nationally-syndicated radio host brokered
a deal to allow unfettered access to air time for church members
instead.14  Many states and municipalities passed laws banning or
limiting such demonstrations at military funerals.15  A Tennessee State
Representative opined, "When you have someone who has given the
ultimate sacrifice for their country, with a community and the family
grieving, I just don't feel it's the appropriate time to be protesting." 6
6. Chandler, 1837 WL 154 at *11.
7. Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, THE





12. SPL Center.org: Hate Groups Map, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/type.
jsp?DT=26 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
13. Alvarez, supra note 7.
14. Alison Hawkes, Fringe Group's Threats Gain Airtime, THE DOYLESTOWN
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 9, 2006, at B 1.
15. Alvarez, supra note 7.
16. Id. Apparently undaunted, the Westboro Baptist Church continues to spread
their controversial message by raising constitutional questions; in December, 2008, they
sought to place a sign proclaiming "Santa Claus Will Take You To Hell" along with
other holiday displays in the Washington State Capitol Building in Olympia, causing
disruption in state government for weeks. See Brad Shannon, New Capitol Display
Sought With Santa 'Hell' Warning, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.
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Although the factual background has changed over time, the conflict
between freedom of expression and equal protection, two oft-cited pillars
of modern American Constitutionalism, rages on. This conflict has
developed in numerous theaters; on one hand, much has been said in the
abstract about limitations on personal freedom in the interest of national
security. In another theater, however, that of hate speech, the United
States must also address its relationship to the growing international
consensus in favor of regulating undesirable speech to protect core social
values.18 This tension has emerged in several contexts on the national
and world stage, including recent disputes over the ability of white
supremacist groups to publicly bum crosses, 19 the ability of a radical
minister and his followers to protest the funerals of American soldiers,2 0
and the ability of pastors to preach sermons condemning
homosexuality.2'
There is a temptation to view this issue as a novel problem, a
product of our own times, to be addressed using only contemporary
insights and the tools of present consensus. This approach, however,
largely overlooks the relationship between the development of the idea of
the preeminence of freedom of speech, America's unique contribution to
that development, and how this process can inform nationally and
globally appropriate policies. As a part of this process, the rise and fall
of secular blasphemy regulation speaks intelligently and helpfully to the
current hate speech debate.
This Comment will attempt to shed light on how the United States'
prior experience with blasphemy speech regulation can positively inform
current approaches to hate speech. Important international comparisons
will also be made where appropriate. In part one, the Comment will
analyze the connection between the history of blasphemy regulation and
17. See, e.g., Kyle Hawkins, Gagging on the First Amendment: Assessing
Challenges to the Reauthorization Act's Nondisclosure Provision, 93 MINN. L. REv. 274
(2008) (discussing the system of nondisclosure required under "national security letters");
Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government's Ability to
Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security Information,
13 COMM. L. & P'Y 447 (2008).
18. The trend toward consideration of international law within American law has
been observed even within opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. This subject has been
the focus of intense debate, and will likely remain so for some time. See, e.g., David G.
Savage, A Justice's International View, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2008, at Al 1 (reporting
reactions to Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy's references to international law in
the decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008)).
19. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
20. See Judge: Church that Protests Funerals Must Pay $5M, YORK DISPATCH
(York, Pa.), Feb. 26, 2008, § Local (addressing efforts of Westboro Baptist Church to
picket soldiers' funerals).
21. See Pastor Acquitted ofHate Speech, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 30, 2005, at 17A.
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the development of hate speech regulation. First, it will review the
history of blasphemy and its regulation within Europe and post-
Revolutionary America. Specifically, the Comment will emphasize how
the justification for blasphemy regulation evolved in tandem with state's
conception of its role vis-a-vis its subjects and citizens. Second, it will
review the rise of the concept of "hate speech" within American society,
and the various judicial and extrajudicial attempts to address it. This
review will necessarily consider the extent of the contemporary practice
of speech valuation and regulation within the United States, in light of
the tension between the American concepts of freedom of expression and
equal protection, represented by the guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The second part of this Comment will present a summary of the
current state of Constitutional jurisprudence with respect to the freedom
of speech in general, and hate speech in particular. It will highlight the
potential impacts of this jurisprudence on salient issues within the United
States, such as the passage of the funeral protest laws.
The third part of this Comment will compare the American position,
as it has presently evolved, with other international approaches to speech
regulation. Three approaches to justifying the regulation of speech, in
terms of a society's fundamental self-understanding, will be examined
and addressed. These approaches, classified as traditional paternalism,
modernist paternalism, and libertarianism, will be briefly examined in
the context of the societies in which they flourish. Finally, the United
States' experience with blasphemy regulation will demonstrate that its
evolved approach, called qualified libertarianism, represents the most
appropriate course for future speech regulation. This approach has not
only served the United States well in the past, but represents a unique
and crucial contribution to future international debate over hate speech
regulation.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Over the course of centuries, political justifications for regulating
speech have developed with the conception of the role of the state.22
This development can be seen in the regulation of blasphemy, which
underwent several metamorphic changes in practice as justifications for
regulation shifted.2 3 Practical applications of blasphemy regulation, in
22. See infra Part L.A for a complete explanation of this development.
23. Compare An act for the more Effectual Suppressing of Blasphemy and
Profaneness, 1698, 9 Wil. III c. 35, reprinted in 7 Statutes of the Realm 409 (1820)
(setting out a strict crime of blasphemy on the basis of offending an established state
theology), with State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837)
(defending blasphemy regulation as a bulwark against breaches of the peace).
2009] 575
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turn, influenced novel theories of the role of speech regulation.24 The
development of these theories created the environment in which the
present judicial and extrajudicial possibilities for the regulation of hate
speech are debated.25 It is therefore imperative to understand the
universe of reference to formulate a solution that is relevant, practical,
and consistent.
A. Blasphemy
Blasphemy, and its regulation, antedates the establishment of the
United States of America, and, indeed, modem European civilization.2 6
The western conception of blasphemy is rooted in the traditions of the
three monotheistic faiths, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.27 In order to
accurately characterize the development of American blasphemy law, I
will look first at its historical origins in Western Europe. A working
knowledge of the shifting justifications for blasphemy regulation is
essential to understanding its application in the American colonies and,
later, the United States.
1. Blasphemy as a Crime Against the Universal Church
The development of blasphemy law in Europe closely followed the
emergence of a Christian society.28 Medieval Europe developed around
the central idea of a sovereign Christian authority, expressed in two
distinct but often overlapping powers, ecclesiastical authority in the
church and temporal authority in the state. 29 This ordering of society
along religious lines ensured a baseline of stability across pre-
Reformation Europe; the disputes chronicled in history, concerning the
24. See generally State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Del. Gen. Sess.
1837).
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See, e.g., Leviticus 24:16 (establishing death by stoning as the punishment for
blasphemy); Luke 24:10 (teaching that blasphemy of the Holy Spirit is unforgivable);
QURAN 9:47 (indicating punishment for those who return to blasphemy).
27. See, e.g., Leviticus 24:16, supra note 26, Luke 24:10, supra note 26, and QURAN
9:47, supra note 26.
28. See David Knowles, Church and State in Christian History, J. CONTEMP. HIST.,
Oct. 1967, at 5-8 (tracing the development of Christian Europe from the time of
Constantine through the Middle Ages). See also Gilbert Huddleston, Pope St. Gregory I
("the Great'), THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1909), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/-cathen/06780a.htm (citing Dudden for the proposition that
from the time of Pope St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), the Pope "acted on the assumption
that all were subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman See").
29. Knowles, supra note 28 (arguing from Pope St. Gregory's epistles that he taught
of a unified commonwealth, with absolute ecclesiastical and temporal governance,
embodied in a pope and emperor, "each supreme in his own department").
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hierarchy of power among rulers vis-A-vis each other and the pope, all
played out within this universe of thought.3 0
In England during this era, the crime of blasphemy was largely
subsumed under the umbrella crime of heresy, and represented an
offense against the Gregorian concept of the root of state authority.31
When John Wycliffe, the proto-Reformer, and his followers, the
"Lollards," suggested in the Fourteenth Century that this ordering of the
state might be susceptible to question, the political-religious apparatus
seized the opportunity to define the mechanism for blasphemy
32prosecutions. Since the time of the Norman Conquest, a charge of
heretical blasphemy had been tried before the ecclesiastical courts, which
had authority to determine the orthodoxy of an individual's doctrine and
33 thconduct.33  Nevertheless, by the 14 century, although guilt was
determined by the ecclesiastical courts, punishments were meted out by
the state.34
The tumultuous Protestant Reformation (1517-1648) altered the
Gregorian justification of political existence in Europe forever, and laid
the foundation for blasphemy regulation that would reach America's
shores.3 5 The latter part of this period, with its extensive religious wars,
redefined government in both Western Europe and in the British Isles.36
As these wars ended, a new society gradually emerged. It was no
longer defined by two poles of sovereign authority, but by a combination
30. See, e.g., the tensions expressed in such documents as the Canons of the First
Lateran Council (1123) between papal and secular authority. See also William
McCready, Papal Plenitudo Potestatis and the Source of Temporal Authority in Late
Medieval Papal Hierocratic Theory, 48 SPECULUM 654 (1973) (discussing the friction
between temporal and ecclesiastical leadership and the theory of plenitude potestatis
advanced by Pope Innocent III (reigned 1198-1216), in which the state was sometimes
seen as an arm of the Church).
31. See LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY 75-81 (1993).
32. Id. at 79.
33. Id. at 75-76.
34. Id. at 80.
35. Cf MARTIN LUTHER, ON SECULAR AUTHORITY (1523), reprinted in THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATION, at 43-52, 55-61 (Hans J. Hillerbrand trans. 1968), available
at http://www.qub.- ac.uk/ iccj/sdixon/REFORMAT/THEOLOGO/HILL6224.HTM, with
Martin Luther, A Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope, THE BOOK OF
CONCORD (1537), available at http://bookofconcord.org/-treatise.php (taken together,
arguing that government authority is not a co-extensive power with an absolute spiritual
ruler over a uniformly Christian state).
36. See generally John E. Drabble, Mary's Protestant Martyrs and Elizabeth's
Catholic Traitors in the Age of Catholic Emancipation, 51 CHURCH HISTORY 172-85
(1982) (demonstrating the long-lasting governance effects of religious tension in
England); Myron P. Gutmann, The Origins of the Thirty Years' War, 18 J.
INTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 749-770 (1988) (explaining the relationships among nations
that gave rise to the Thirty Years' War, and discussing its effects on European
civilization).
37. See Gutmann, supra note 36, at 749.
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of the powers of sacred and secular into the nation-state and the national
church. On the continent, with the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), spiritual authority was fractured and local rulers were
free to adopt one of a limited number of confessions of faith to be
applied to their subjects, whether Roman Catholic, Evangelical
(Lutheran), or Calvinist (Reformed). 9
While the Thirty Years' War raged on the Continent, England was
experiencing its own Civil War (1642-1649).40 That struggle, in which
the Parliamentarians fought the ostensibly political excesses of King
Charles I, has been characterized broadly as a proxy war between Anglo-
Catholic (Royalist) and Protestant (Puritan) schools of thought.4'
Although the specific circumstances behind this war in England diverged
from those on the continent, they can be regarded as a similar, albeit
delayed, catharsis to the English Reformation itself, which was uniquely
imposed from above by King Henry VIII in 1534.42 Following its
continental siblings, British society, after the Restoration of 1660 and the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, firmly established Anglican Protestantism
as the dominant state religion; there was limited tolerance for Protestant
dissenters, but extensive disenfranchisement of Roman Catholics.43
In England as on the Continent, the lack of tolerance outside the
nationally established religion demonstrated the rise of the idea of
national sovereignty, including sovereignty over religion.4 In other
words, rather than a universal acquiescence to one true church which was
the source of society's order, the national church was now a
manifestation of the state, which could establish one of a limited number
38. See Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Suecicum Sive Osnabrugense [Treaty of
Westphalia], Oct. 24, 1648, reprinted in EMIL REICH, SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING
MEDIEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY 4 (1905), translated in The Avalon Project, available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/west-phal.asp (1648) (recognizing the rights of
various principalities to co-exist in a Christian peace divided along confessional lines).
39. Id. This concept has been expressed using the Latin phrase cuius regio, eius
religio ("whose rule, whose religion").
40. See generally SAMUEL R. GARDINER, HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR, 1642-
1649 (London, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1886) (characterizing the war as a result of
irreconcilable religious and political difficulties between the followers of Hooker
(Anglican theologian) and the followers of Calvin (Puritan theologian)).
41. See generally id.
42. (First) Act of Supremacy, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1. This Act established the
supremacy of the civil laws over the church, effectively nationalizing the Church of
England. While Henry thus accomplished for England in one act what took myriad wars
and treaties elsewhere, the lack of popular involvement led to a decisive realignment of
society along Reformation principles, including tolerance, a century later.
43. See ALEXANDRA WALSHAM, CHARITABLE HATRED: TOLERANCE AND
INTOLERANCE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1700 7 (2006) (outlining, inter alia, developments in
religious tolerance in mid- to late-17 century England).
44. See, e.g., (First) Act of Supremacy, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1.
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of acceptable varieties of religion.45 The aftermath of the Reformation
essentially turned on its head the medieval theory that the state was an
expression of the church.46 Although documents such as the Peace of
Westphalia assured some degree of toleration, they were frequently
disregarded.47
Shaken from the steady, millennium-old moorings of Gregory the
Great's duality theory of governance, Western Europe grasped for a new
justification to order its society.4 The passage of a century and several
wars legitimized the confessional model of international governance,
which removed ultimate temporal and spiritual authority from the church
and reposed it in the state. 49 Accordingly, the state needed and assumed
power, as Luther had predicted, to restrain the activities of those who
sought to undercut its legitimacy.o Under this conception, blasphemy
prosecution was essential as a defense against attacks on the state's
justification for its own existence.5  The stage was now set for the
renegotiation of the basis for the crime of blasphemy.
2. Blasphemy as a Crime against the Authority of the State
In this new worldview, blasphemy continued to be perceived as a
crime against the foundation of the state's existence.52 As stated above,
45. See id.
46. See McCready, supra note 30 at 654.
47. The French King Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, for
example, led to mass "conversion" and emigration to other parts of the continent by the
French Huguenot Protestants. Louis XIV, Edict of Fontainebleau, Oct. 22, 1685,
reprinted in ISAMBERT, RECUEIL GENERAL DES ANCIENNES LOIS FRANCAISES XIX 530,
reprinted in J.H. ROBINSON, 2 READINGS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 180-83 (J.H. Robinson
trans., 1906), available at http://huguenotsweb.free.fr/english/edict_1685.htm.
Throughout Europe, merciless persecution of the Anabaptists continued into the early
18th century, resulting in almost complete migration of that group to North America. For
an excellent series of first-hand accounts of the persecution of Anabaptists by state
churches of all confessions in continental Europe, particularly Switzerland and the
Netherlands, during the 16th and 17th centuries, see THEILEMAN J. VAN BRAGHT, THE
BLOODY THEATER OR MARTYRS MIRROR OF THE DEFENSELESS CHRISTIANS (1660, Eng.
Reprint 2002).
48. See Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Suecicum Sive Osnabrugense [Treaty of
Westphalia], Oct. 24, 1648, reprinted in EMIL REICH, SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING
MEDIEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY 4 (1905), translated in The Avalon Project, available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edull7th-century/west-phal.asp (1648) (recognizing the rights of
various principalities to co-exist in a Christian peace divided along confessional lines).
49. See REICH, supra note 48 at 4.
50. See LUTHER, ON SECULAR AUTHORITY, supra note 35 at 43-52, 55-61.
51. See id.
52. See ALEXANDER ADAM SEATON, THE THEORY OF TOLERATION UNDER THE LATER
STUARTS 30-35 (1910) (setting forth the post-Reformation shift from state as an arm of
the church to church as an arm of the state, and providing numerous examples of political
instabilities in 16th and 171h century England that were based in religious differences).
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however, this existence was no longer based on a Gregorian duality that
afforded coequal authority to the church. Now, authority rested
entirely in the state as intermediary between God and subjects, according
to the principle of the state as confessional sovereign.54 The monarch of
Britain was proclaimed "Defender of the Faith" and recognized as the
head of the Church in England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland,
whenever he or she should be located within the realm.55 It followed that
an offense against the state- church was also an offense against the
state.s6
This principle is seen in early case law. In 1649, at the close of the
English Civil War, John Lilburne was tried with treason.57 In
adjudicating this case, the court noted not only that "the law of England
is the law of God," but emphasized its reciprocal, "The law of God is the
law of England."5 8 In other words, England's laws were an expression of
the Divine Law. 59  Because of this intertwined foundation, an attack
against one principle was treasonous as against the other.60
This theory of governance was also shown in the long, gradual path
by which Dissenters, those outside the Established Church, were
recognized in England during this period.6' Notably, Puritans, Quakers,
Baptists and other Non-Conformists were viewed, at best, as inconsistent
with the proper ordering of the state; at worst, they were viewed as
subversive and treasonous.62
Blasphemy cases during this period show the implementation of this
theory of governance, and that blasphemy was prosecuted as an offense
53. See supra Part I(A)(1).
54. See SEATON, supra note 52 at 30-35.
55. J. S. BREWER, THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII: FROM His ACCESSION TO THE DEATH OF
WOLSEY 405-06 (London, John Murray, 1884). This appellation, Fidei Defensor, was
actually granted by Pope Leo X to King Henry VIII in 1521, before the English
Reformation, when the duality of power concept was at its zenith. Although the title was
revoked by Pope Paul III after the break between England and Rome, it was maintained
by Henry and has been perpetuated by all British monarchs to this day as a representation
of the monarch's role as head of the Established Church. Id.
56. See SEATON, supra note 52 at 30-35.
57. A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS UPON HIGH-
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD 11
TO THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE II 1307-11, 3d ed. (London, John Walthoe, 1742)
[hereinafter COLLECTION OF TRIALS].
58. Id.; W. S. HOLDWORTH, 8 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 403 n.5 (1926).
59. See COLLECTION OF TRIALS, supra note 57, at 1307-11.
60. See id.
61. See generally SEATON, supra note 52.
62. For a detailed discussion of the development of toleration toward Dissenters in
England, see generally SEATON, supra note 52. See also An Act for Exempting Their
Majestyes Protestant Subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties
of certaine Laws [hereinafter Dissenters Exemption], 1688, 1 Wil. & Mary c. 18 (1688),
reprinted in 6 Statutes of the Realm 74 (1819).
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against the foundation of the state.63 In 1676, in Taylor's Case,6" Lord
Justice Hale characterized blasphemy as not only "a crime against the
laws, State and Government," insofar as "Christianity is parcel of the
laws of England," but also stated that to blaspheme "is to dissolve all
those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved." 6 5
In 1698, Parliament passed the Blasphemy Act, which established
numerous civil restrictions on those who, having been "educated in or at
any time made Profession of the Christian religion," prohibiting them
from denying the doctrine of the Trinity, asserting that there are more
gods than one, or denying the authority of the Old and New
Testaments.66 This Act, although consistent with a governmental desire
to repress dissent among the more radical nonconformists, Deists, and
atheists, was rarely enforced.6 7
Just thirteen short years after the decision in Taylor's Case,
however, the Toleration Act of 1689 represented a decisive crack in the
post-Reformation confessional model of state legitimacy. 8 In the
century that followed, additional efforts at toleration not only broadened
freedom of speech and worship, but weakened the conception of the state
as absolute guardian of the welfare of its subjects. 6 9 After an extended
struggle, liberalization granted extensive rights not only to
nonconforming Protestants, but also to Roman Catholics and Jews in the
early 1 9 th century.
70
Within this period of history, sweeping changes occurred in the self-
definition of the state vis-A-vis blasphemy regulation.7  Toleration of
religious opinions contrary to the established religion represented an
implicit acknowledgement, at least on a practical level, that society could
survive even if all individuals did not conform to a national norm.72
Although not a complete acknowledgement, this shift suggested that
society was a collection of individuals, rather than an absolute order
which provided for the well-being of its subjects.7 3 Accommodation of
individuality and notions of popular sovereignty and the common weal
63. See generally Taylor's Case, 1 Vent. 293, 86 Eng. Rep. 189 (K.B. 1676).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. An act for the more Effectual Suppressing of Blasphemy and Profaneness, 1698,
9 Wil. III c. 35, reprinted in 7 Statutes of the Realm 409 (1820).
67. LEVY, supra note 31, at 326 (1993).
68. Dissenters Exemption, supra note 62.
69. See generally LEVY, supra note 31.
70. See TODD M. ENDELMAN, THE JEWS OF GEORGIAN ENGLAND 1714-1830 44-47
(1999).
71. See generally LEVY, supra note 31.
72. See generally id.
73. See generally id.
5812009]
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were arising, evidenced in the growing power of Parliament in Britain.7 4
A conception of the state as an outgrowth of individual and collective
autonomy formed the core of these beliefs, represented chiefly in the
social contract theory developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.7 5
As the very justification for the ordering of society shifted once
more, the justification for blasphemy regulation was again orphaned.76 It
sought a new justification, and found it in the republican concept of
public morality.
3. Blasphemy as a Crime Against Public Morals and its
Transplantation to America
When Sir William Blackstone issued his celebrated Commentaries
on the Laws of England in 1765-1769, his characterization of the crime
of blasphemy was based in public morals.77 Predictably, Blackstone
reaffirmed the traditional black-letter statement that blasphemy "is
punishable at common law by fine or imprisonment; for [C]hristianity is
part of the laws of England."78 Blackstone further justified the state of
the law, however, according to the theory that
[C]rimes and misdemeanors are a breach and violation of the public
rights and duties, owing to the whole community, considered as a
community, in its social aggregate capacity.... [H]uman laws can
have no concern with any but social and relative duties; being
intended to regulate only the conduct of man . . . considered as a
member of civil society.
The prosecution of blasphemy, then, was acceptable only if the
impact of blasphemy upon society had such a negative effect as to
threaten its very foundation.8 0 For Blackstone, although blasphemy was
74. JoHN CALYER RANNEY, GWENDOLEN MARGARET CARTER, AND JOHN H. HERZ,
MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS 23 (1957).
75. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Yale U. Press
2003) (1689); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1651); JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762) (Yale U. Press 2002). In addition to
their influence on govemance in the British Isles, it is useful from a comparative
perspective to review the practical continental policies influenced by these philosophies,
such as the benevolent dictator model adopted by Emperor Joseph II of Austria during the
1780s, and the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" adopted in Revolutionary France in
1789.
76. See infra Part I.A.3.
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essentially a religious crime, its "bad example and consequence" affected
"the law of society" sufficiently to justify its regulation.
Blackstone's effort to provide an effects-test justification for
blasphemy regulation did not go uncriticized. 82  One of the newly-
enfranchised class, a dissenting minister named Philip Fumeaux,
challenged Blackstone's entire justification for continued blasphemy
regulation.83  Although he drew on the ideas of those before him,
Furneaux was the first prominent proponent of a pure market-based
approach to free speech with reference to religious toleration.84
Throughout his "Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone,"
Furneaux remonstrated against the existence of laws that punished
spiritual offenses, including blasphemy.85 Furneaux had a unique ethos
in his argument.86 Although he was a devout Christian and appreciated
the truths of the doctrines that the state sought to uphold, as a dissenter,
he had struggled to obtain equality under many of these statutes
respecting the Established Church.8 7
Furneaux used a two pronged attack against religion-based category
of laws, including blasphemy.8 8 Using the weakened justification for the
state's prerogative over religion, he attacked state regulation of spiritual
crimes, whose punishments belonged to a "future world." 89
More significantly, however, Furneaux argued for a market
regulation of offenses that threatened society's religious sensitivities.90
He argued, forcefully, that a religion grounded in truth-as he believed
the Christian religion to be-was capable of defending itself against its
enemies without recourse to the law.91 According to Furneaux,
blasphemers would be answered with theologically correct arguments,
and their aberrant behavior would destroy their credibility with the public
without a need for legal intervention.92 Moreover, Furneaux argued,
legal intervention might only arouse the curious and contribute to the
success of the blasphemer's cause.93 Furman advocated state
81. Id. at 69.
82. LEVY, supra note 31, at 327.
83. Id. at 327.
84. Id. at 328.
85. Id. at 327-30.
86. See id. at 327.
87. See LEVY, supra note 31 at 327 (showing that Furneaux had argued for
dissenters' rights in previous cases and was capable of memorizing entire speeches to
prove his point).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 328.
90. Id. at 329.
91. Id.
92. LEVY, supra note 31 at 329.
93. See id.
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intervention only in the case of "overt acts that adversely affected the
public peace." 9 4
The dueling perspectives of Blackstone and Furneaux represent the
tensions between the emerging nature of the state and its reflection in
speech regulation. On the one hand, blasphemy regulation was justified
as necessary to preserve public morals, public order, and to guard the
people against that which would provoke them to breach the peace.9' In
this conception, the state acted as a moral guardian of the people,
achieving an optimum result through planning and regulation.96 On the
other hand, blasphemy regulation was unjustifiable as an impermissible
restraint on the development of society and the strengthening of its
values through rigorous testing.97 In this conception, the state acted as a
facilitator of the organic growth of society, which could be trusted to
advance according to its own devices. 98
As American common law developed following the Revolution and
separation from England, fundamental decisions had to be made
concerning the applicability of the underlying rationale for blasphemy
legislation in light of Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion
and the prohibition of an "establishment of religion." 99 Blasphemy's first
test in the United States came with People v. Ruggles,'00 which sought to
maintain the former justifications under the new regime.o10 The oft-cited
holding in this case, that the state's interest in prosecuting blasphemy
existed on the basis that Christianity was part of American common law,
overlooks the lessons contained in the underlying analysis.1 02  In
determining whether Ruggles' conduct of "wickedly, wantonly and
maliciously uttering, 'Jesus Christ is a bastard, and his mother must be a
whore' was punishable at law, the Ruggles court had to reach the
threshold issue of whether blasphemy constituted a crime at the common
law and, if so, on what basis.'0o
Ruggles argued that blasphemy regulations, which had been
recognized as part of English common law, were implicitly abrogated
following the American Revolution by the disestablishment of the
national church.' 04
94. Id. at 328.
95. See generally id.
96. See generally id.
97. See LEVY, supra note 31.
98. See generally id.
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
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Implicit in Ruggles' argument was the acceptance of Furneaux's
overt acts test: that speech of a religious nature ought not be criminal at
all if there is no overt act that immediately harms society. 05  Ruggles
further argued that the protection of freedom of religion permitted him to
express the viewpoints of another religion which would, if necessary,
deny fundamental tenets of Christianity such as the virgin birth.'06  In
short, Ruggles sought to establish that the paramount object of American
governance was not the direct maintenance of the state, per se, through
the regulation of its citizens welfare; rather, it was to serve as a
protection of individual rights.'07
In rejecting these arguments, the court retreated even beyond the
safety of Blackstone.'08  It accused Ruggles of declaring moral
equivalency between New York and "savage tribes and semibarbarous
nations," and advocating for the dangerous excesses of Revolutionary
France.109 The court declared that, indeed, the basic conception of
Christianity had been incorporated into American common law.10
Moreover, as that religion formed the basis of social norms, attacks
against Christianity's founder could be prohibited even apart from an
establishment of religion."' These prohibitions were to protect civilized
society from "a gross violation of decency and good order," and to
restrict the blasphemer's ability to "corrupt the morals of the people."ll 2
In forming these opinions, the court in Ruggles was particularly
solicitous of the "virtuous part of the community" and the "tender morals
of the young."" 3 The court implicitly adopted Blackstone's theory that
the protection of community decency and social order justified regulation
of blasphemy against the majority's religious culture.1 4 For this reason,
the court declared that the blasphemy statute did not prevent equivalent
105. See Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 290 (Ruggles argued that a constitutional reference to





109. Id. (noting with respect to France that "none of the institutions of modem
Europe, (a single and monitory case excepted,) ever hazarded such a bold experiment
upon the solidity of the public morals" (emphasis in original)).
110. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 290 (curiously holding that "Such offences have always
been considered independent of any religious establishment or the rights of the church.
They are treated as affecting the essential interests of civil society." (emphasis added))
111. See id. (stating that, "The people of this state, in common with the people of this
country, profess the general doctrines of christianity, as the rule of their faith and
practice," and reasoning therefore that "whatever strikes at the root of christianity, tends
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statements against other religions, such as "the religion of Mahomet or
the grand Lama."' 5
Even in a land without an established religion, the Ruggles court
had come down plainly on the side of permitting blasphemy prohibition
to ensure a productive and harmonious society." 6 The stability of the
public, as the source of power within the new nation, was predicated on
state protection of its religious scruples." 7
Within its decision, however, the court recognized an important
delineation of what constituted "blasphemy" and could be legitimately
regulated." 8  It emphasized that Ruggles' blasphemous speech was
"uttered in a wanton manner . .. with a wicked and malicious
disposition, and not in a serious discussion upon any controverted point
in religion."" 9 According to the court, had the phrase been uttered by
"learned men" in a "dispute upon particular ... points," it would have
been acceptable.12 0
The court was careful to draw a fine line between what it called
"popular" blasphemy and "legal" blasphemy, as only the latter was
punishable at law.121 Legal blasphemy seems to have involved speech
that, in the view of the court, was devoid of value.122  Popular
blasphemy, although it might sound the same to the uninformed listener,
was permitted in that it had value in order to advance scholarly debate
about "controverted points."l23 It did not serve to undercut society's
moral norms, and was therefore not subject to regulation.12 4
The next test for blasphemy came eleven years later, in
Pennsylvania.12 5  In Updegraph v. Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court took great pains to decide what it termed "the question":
whether Christianity was incorporated into the common law.12 6
The court answered this question in the affirmative after engaging in
a lengthy discourse focusing on the merits of the Christian religion.127
Like the New York court in Ruggles, however, the Updegraph court




119. Id. (emphasis added).





125. Updegraph v. Pennsylvania, 1824 WL 2393 (Pa. 1824).
126. Id. at *5.
127. See id
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sought to determine whether the crime of blasphemy had a place in the
new republic.' 28
In his argument, Updegraph first claimed that the freedom of
religion inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution was inconsistent with
a prohibition of blasphemy. 129 In the alternative, Updegraph argued that,
even if blasphemy did exist at common law in Pennsylvania, his
comments did not legally constitute blasphemy, because they were made
as a "discussion" in a "deliberative assembly," during the course of a
public debate.13 0
The court found for Updegraph on a technicality; his indictment did
not include the word "profanely."' 3 ' Nevertheless, the court concluded
that Christianity was part of the common law.132 As such, it could be
protected by prohibitions against "atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the
Christian religion." 33 According to the court, however, within the scope
of Christian teaching, "Bare non-conformity is no sin." 34 Fundamental
protection of Christian principles, without regard to denominational
considerations, were essential, for without them, "no free government
can long exist." 35 The court reasoned that, without these protections,
"the dangerous temporal consequences likely to proceed from the
removal of religious and moral restraints" would be legion and
uncontrollable.13 6
Echoing Blackstone, the court held the ultimate basis for such moral
restraints was "to preserve the peace of the country by an outward
respect to the religion of the country.,l 37 The court held, "Every
immoral act is not indictable, but when it is destructive of morality
generally, it is, because it weakens the bonds by which society is held
together, and government is nothing more than public order."' 3 8
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393 at *5.
131. Id. at *13.
132. Id. at *8.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393 at *8 (These principles, in the view of the court,
could be reduced to permitting public office to be held by "any believer in a God ... with
the necessary addition of a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments.").
136. Id. at *9. In yet another thinly veiled reference to the perceived horrors of the
French Revolution, the court vividly depicted its genuine fear of where a slippery slope
could lead. It envisioned a society in which debate societies would "dedicate the club-
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In condemning blasphemy, however, the court needed to articulate a
standard for determining which speech weakened society's bonds. The
court adopted the distinction between legal blasphemy and popular
blasphemy and sought to value speech.139  The court determined "a
malicious and mischievous intention" to be the "broad boundary between
right and wrong."l 4 0 Accordingly, the court found that limited toleration
of other religions was consistent with this practice.141 For example,
positive promotion of divergent religious beliefs, both Christian and non-
Christian, were to be tolerated; it was only when someone crossed the
line to attack the Christian religion that a person ran afoul of the law.14 2
After Updegraph, blasphemy regulation was justified on the
principle that society had an interest in limiting speech that would
threaten its fundamental stability.14 3  Accordingly, blasphemy was
punishable as an offense against the common law rooted in
Christianity.144  Furneaux's market-testing idea had failed to prevail
against notions of ideological protectionism.14 5  Because of its
ideological protectionism, the court could reconcile the principles of
freedom of conscience and worship and the freedom to commit
blasphemy, finding them "directly opposed." 4 6  The definition of
"blasphemy," however, was narrowed to speech or writing that displayed
a "malicious and mischievous intention," that threatened the roots of
society, and had no redeeming value.14 7 The government had a role as an
arbiter of the value of speech in terms of constitutional governance
objectives.14 8
The third leading case for the exploration of the role of blasphemy
in the American common law occurred in Delaware in 1837.149 In State
v. Chandler,'50 the defendant had again been found guilty of blasphemy
for proclaiming that "the virgin Mary was a whore and Jesus Christ was
a bastard."'"' Like its predecessors in New York and Pennsylvania, the
139. Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393 at *10.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *9 (citing with approval a speech by the Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar
stating that, at the time of the colonization, religious tolerance could be liberally given, in
that "the number of Jews was too inconsiderable to excite alarm, and the believers in
Mahomet were not likely to intrude.").
142. See id.
143. See generally id.
144. See generally id.
145. See generally Updegraph, 1824 WL 2393 at *9.
146. Id. at *12.
147. See id.
148. See generally id.
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Delaware court accepted Christianity as a part of the common law, and
blasphemy as a punishable offense. 5 2  It adopted the argument that
blasphemy should be punished when it contravened public peace, noting
that the common law "adapted itself to the religion of the country just so
far as was necessary for the peace and safety of civil institutions; but it
took cognizance of offences against God only, when by their inevitable
effects, they became offences against man and his temporal security."'13
The court cited numerous statutes, including the blasphemy statute of
1826, to demonstrate that Christianity "has been and is now the religion
preferred by the people of Delaware."l
54
Unlike its predecessors, however, the Delaware Court moved
somewhat in the direction of Furneaux.' Instead of stopping at the
pronouncement that Christianity was part of the common law, as was
usually the case, the court added:
We hold, and have already said, that the people of Delaware have a
full and perfect constitutional right to change their religion as often as
they see fit. They may to-morrow, if they think it right, profess
Mahometanism or Judaism, or adopt any other religious creed they
please; and so far from any court having power to punish them for
such an exercise of right, all their judges are bound to notice their
free choice and religious preference, and to protect them in the
exercise of their right. 56
Accordingly, whichever religion the people should adopt, laws to
protect the peace by preventing attacks on it were constitutional.157 Such
protectionism, however, did not extend to the principles of any religion
beyond the extent that they had an impact on the public peace. 58
Although it remained anchored in the language of the previous opinions,
the Delaware court took a giant leap in the direction of Furneaux's
argument.159 In fact, the court quoted Furneaux with approval, stating,
"We fully concur with the sentiments of Dr. Furneaux." 60 The court
152. See id.
153. Id. at *5.
154. Chandler, 1837 WL 154 at *9-*11.
155. See generally id.
156. Id.at*1l.
157. Id. at *12.
158. Id. The court quoted an essay in support of its proposition:
[C]hristianity requires no aid from force or persecution; she asks not to be
guarded by fines and forfeitures. She stands secure in the armour of truth and
reason. She seeks not to establish her principles by political aid and legal
enactments. She seeks mildly and peaceably to establish them in the hearts of
the people.
Id. (quoting Am. QUAR. REVIEW, June 1835, at 338).
159. See generally Chandler, 1837 WL 154.
160. Id. at *16.
5892009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
concluded, "When human justice is rightly administered according to our
common law and our constitution, it refuses all jurisdiction over crimes
against God, unless they are by necessary consequence crimes against
civil society, and known and defined as such by the law of man." 6 1
With subtle semantic shifts, blasphemy law slowly began to depart
from the moral protectionism advocated by Blackstone and toward the
more utilitarian approach posited by Furneaux. 162 In a free society,
government intervention into speech, whether against blasphemy or
otherwise, was justified only in relationship to the effects that such
speech had on society.163 There must be some inherent judgment that
speech lacked utility, and this judgment would facilitate the regulation of
such speech. 164
4. The Decline and Fall of Blasphemy Regulation
The few blasphemy cases that arose following Chandler were
justified on the basis of preserving the public peace.165 The last known
charge of blasphemy in the United States was brought against Charles
Lee Smith, an atheist who opened a store front selling literature in Little
Rock, Arkansas. 16 6 He was prosecuted twice under a local ordinance
prohibiting blasphemy in 1928, but the case was eventually dismissed. 16 7
Finally, in 1952, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson,1 68 the Supreme
Court effectively eliminated blasphemy regulations throughout the
United States. 169 There, a New York statute permitted the "banning of
motion picture films on the ground that they are sacreligious."o70 The
Court held that the statute was invalid, considering at length a narrow
definition of sacrilege that was inapplicable to American
jurisprudence.' 7' The Court then accepted, for the purpose of its
analysis, the New York Court's interpretation of the meaning of
161. Id. at*13.
162. See, e.g., id.
163. See generally id.
164. This shift exemplified a much larger zeitgeist. It is no coincidence that this era
marked the flourishing of such philosophers as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), whose
utilitarian philosophy of 'the greatest good for the greatest number' had a profound
influence on thought for generations to come. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1907) (1780).




168. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952).
169. See id. at 497.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 505-06.
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sacrilegious, "that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary,
reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and
ridicule."1 72 This definition was so different from the standard definition
of sacrilege; indeed, it was far more akin to the ancient crime of
blasphemy.173  The Court then determined that such a provision was
unconstitutional, even if based on ostensibly protecting the sensitivities
of the majority in the interest of public security.174 The Court justified
this shift from the reasoning of the prior century by relying, as it often
did, on statistical computations.175 According to the latest reports from
the Census Bureau, there were now in excess of 300 religious sects in
America. 176 How, the Court reasoned, under a Constitution that
guaranteed the free exercise of religion, and prohibited interference
between church and state,177 could it be expected to enforce the
censorship of any film that might ostensibly offend one of these
groups?178 The court reasoned that such power is "far from the kind of
narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out
to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society."
In Wilson, which treats all sects on an equal footing, we see a
logical leap from the protection of the majority interests as espoused in
Chandler, to the manifestation of the principle of pluralism. 80 As seen
in Wilson, this principle dictated that the existence of the freedom of
speech, Holmes' "marketplace of ideas," was the best arbiter of what
constituted appropriate speech.' 8' This Court implicitly assumes this
principle as it gives weight to the reaction of various individuals and
groups to the banned film at issue in Wilson.182 Notably, in illustrating
172. Id. at 504.
173. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 524-25.
174. See id. at 531-32.
175. Id. at 530-31.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishing the phrase, "a
wall of separation between church and state," within the traditions of American
jurisprudence).
178. This attempt at disentanglement has not proven a resounding success, as
subsequent history and litigation have proven. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005) (holding that a display of the Ten Commandments on public grounds was
constitutional) with McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(holding that a display of the Ten Commandments on public grounds was
unconstutional). See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3289, 3524, 3528, 3017 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008) (No. 07-
665), as an illustration of the tension created by competing strains of traditionalism and
pluralism.
179. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 504.
180. See generally id.
18 1. See generally id.
182. See id. at 509-14 (discussing the reactions of various reviewers and critics).
2009] 591
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
the plurality of views on the definition of sacrilege or blasphemy, Justice
Reed's concurrence considered the opinion of groups as diverse as
Protestant clergymen and L'Osservatore Romano.'83 Within this setting,
Furneaux's argument of self-regulation by the market with respect to
blasphemy, and other religious sentiments which may be held by a
popular majority, had finally triumphed over the moral protectionism of
Blackstone.' 84
5. The Retained Role of Obscenity Regulation
Nevertheless, an element of protectionism remained, with respect to
the offense of obscenity. In the landmark obscenity case of Roth v.
United States,'85 however, the prohibition of obscenity was expressly
upheld as not contrary to the protection of the First Amendment.,86 In
Roth, the Court defined obscenity as "material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest," a distinctively objective
standard.' 87 The Court found obscenity to be valueless relative to the
understood purpose of the First Amendment, which was to "assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of social and
political changes desired by the people." 8  Obscenity was deemed to be
"utterly without redeeming social importance."l 89 Moreover, the court
found obscenity especially suited to regulation because of its intrusion
into the home, where children might easily access its message. 190
Children, according to Justice Stevens' concurrence, "[are] not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
First Amendment guarantees."' 91
These cases show the development of a clear presumption toward
permitting speech, including blasphemy, with the understanding that
American society was no longer homogeneous and there was no
objective societal standard to measure what blasphemy might offend
which religious group.19 2 Obscenity was excepted from this presumption
because it ostensibly had no value in the public debate.19 3 Beyond its
lack of value, its proscription was justified by referencing the interests of
183. Id. at 509, 513-14.
184. See Wilson, 343 U.S. at 509-14.
185. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 487, 489-90.
188. Id. at 484.
189. Id.
190. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
191. Id. at 757 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649-50 (1968)).
192. See Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 509-14.
193. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
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children.194  This awkward shift, which split apart two traditionally
related offenses, permitting the one and prohibiting the other,
demonstrates the tension between an embrace of the First Amendment
and a retention of the view that a nation is responsible for preserving its
own social conscience. The shift away from blasphemy regulation
occurred because it could no longer be justified in terms of preserving
the public peace. 195 In the eyes of the Court, America's diversity served
to justify a pluralistic philosophy that would have made prosecution of
blasphemy for this purpose enormously complex and unwieldy.1 96 Nor,
in the light of this pluralism, did courts want to draw lines and formulate
tests to determine whether potentially blasphemous speech had
redeeming academic or social value, as they had done in the 18th and 19 th
centuries. 19 7 The Court, however, was more than willing to apply a
nearly identical rationale to obscenity cases. 98
In the context of obscenity regulation, the notion of safeguarding
society from attacks on the sensibilities of its citizens survived.1 99 This
was possible because, with respect to obscenity, enough of a social
consensus existed to justify its continued proscription.20 0 Much as it had
been in the early blasphemy cases, protection from moral outrage was
recast in terms of the valuation of speech.2 0 1 In addition to the idea of
social value, the welfare of children and the peculiar nuances of modem
broadcasting capabilities were called upon to preserve obscenity
regulation. 20 2
Although the rise of the First Amendment, coupled with the
Fourteenth, shifted the balance in favor of a broad protection for free
speech, it also created new tensions with respect to other rights,
particularly that of equal protection under the laws.
B. Hate Speech
1. A Shift in the Balance: First Amendment Rights come to the
Forefront
The freedom of speech, as a normative value, has always been
highly prized in the United States; indeed, the words, "Congress shall
194. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 757 (1978).
195. See Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 509-14.
196. See id.
197. See id. See also People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 290.
198. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
199. See generally id
200. See generally id.
201. See generally id.
202. See id. at 484.
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make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" formed part of the
first of the ten amendments proposed in the Bill of Rights.203
Nevertheless, the contours of the right remained undefined for an
extended period. As seen above, the co-existence of blasphemy
regulation, at the very least, to say nothing of obscenity regulation and
the toleration of the Sedition Act of 1798, have always suggested that the
right was not absolute, and that, like other fundamental rights, it had
limits. 2 0 4 These events, however, only began to define how these rights
interacted and how the boundaries between them should be defined.
A preliminary attempt at establishing this contextualization came
during the First World War, in Schenck v. United States.20 5 In Schenck,
the Court, stating that "the character of every act depends on the
circumstances in which it is done," found that virulent political
opposition to the draft, consisting of mailing pamphlets to inductees
urging them to resist, although possibly permissible in peacetime, is not
protected by First Amendment during a time of war.20 6
In the American Constitutional system, however, the baseline for
this contextualization has been set far on the side of an expansive right to
speech. Six years after Schenck, the Supreme Court determined that the
First Amendment freedom of speech was protected against state
encroachment by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 7 This decision proved to be the first in a long line of
decisions that expanded the vitality of the right of freedom of speech.20 8
Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States20 9 provides
the rationale for this expansion. 21 0 Holmes argued that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached in free trade in ideas," and supported what
came to be known as the "marketplace of ideas" concept for an
expansive right to freedom of speech.2 1 1
203. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Indeed, the inclusion of this language was essential to the
anti-federalists' assent to the passage of the corpus of the Constitution, despite objections
raised by the Federalists that it was unnecessary and inherently assumed. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally JUHANI RADINKO, JAMES
MADISON AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: MAJOR DEBATES IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2004).
204. See Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. But see New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (providing numerous examples, both historical and
contemporary, to demonstrate that the Sedition Act, although untested in the Supreme
Court, was found unconstitutional "in the court of history").
205. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
206. Id. at 51-52.
207. Gitlow v. People of the State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
208. See, e.g., Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (holding that prior police approval for religious solicitation is unconstitutional).
209. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
210. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
211. Id. See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (reaffirming
the concept and holding that "the classroom is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas).
594 [Vol. 114:2
Is HATE SPEECH BECOMING THE NEW BLASPHEMY?
Nevertheless, the Court has not hesitated to explore the limit of the
right of freedom of speech as it interferes with competing constitutional
values. In some instances, these competing values are compelling
enough to override the First Amendment freedom. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,2 12 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New Hampshire
law prohibiting one individual from addressing another with "any
offensive, derisive, or annoying word," and so established what came to
be known as the "fighting words" doctrine of constitutional speech
restriction.213 In so doing, the Court noted that "certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech" were excluded from Constitutional
* 214
protections. This was so, the Court said, because these classes of
speech center around "an immediate breach of the peace."2 15 Such
speech falls out of the First Amendment's protections because it is "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas."2 16 The Court in Chaplinsky
suggests that freedom of speech can be limited, at least at the margins,
based on judicial determinations of its academic and social value. 2 17 This
argument is emblematic of the justification for gradations of blasphemy
during the early republic, and survives in the context of obscenity
regulation today.218 It provides a basis for the idea, developed
afterwards, that there can be content-based limitations on freedom of
speech. The evolving tension between "content" and "categorical" bases
for limitation will be further explored infra.
2. Hate Speech
At first glance, it seems simple to suggest that, given the default
preference under the U.S. Constitutional structure for freedom of
expression, hate speech, by default, is permissible. Nevertheless, as has
been seen in the case of obscenity, the desire for prohibiting speech to
defend community ideals remains strong.2 19 It is therefore possible, even
likely, that ingenuity in applying non-traditional approaches may
accomplish an otherwise unconstitutional result. These non-traditional
approaches include institutional speech codes, 220 Title VII "Hostile
Environment Provisions, a conception of expression as an
212. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
213. Id. at 569.
214. Id. at 571-72.
215. Id. at 572.
216. Id.
217. See generally Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
218. See supra Part I.A.3.
219. See supra Part I.A.
220. See generally TIMOTHY J. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL (1998).
221. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e (2006).
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indistinguishable component of action,222 and even, potentially, an
attempt to differentiate based on the valuation of speech.
The rise of a national consciousness defining a distinct category of
speech as "hate speech" can be traced to the post-World War II and Civil
Rights Era.223 During this era, American society was permeated with an
increasing sensitivity to ethnic, racial, and religious prejudices following
the conflict with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.2 2 4
Moreover, this era also marked the zenith of the United States' conscious
efforts to differentiate itself from the Soviet Union, which attempted to
contrast its stated policies of racial equality with its capitalist rival.22 5 To
this end, with the fresh application of the post-Civil War Amendments'
guarantees of equal protection and due process, the emphasis on equality
as a distinctively American value reached a level it had not enjoyed since
post-Civil War days; speech as well as action that was seen as hostile to
226the emerging value of equal protection came under increasing scrutiny.
Within this milieu, academic theories helped to advance the notion
that hate speech was far more destructive to the paramount right to
equality than possessive of inherent value as free speech.22 7 Psychologist
222. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 49-51 (25th
Anniversary ed. 1979).
223. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is
Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1548, 1563 (2004)
224. See id. (examining correlation between Civil Rights movement's legal success
and international pressure from Nazi and Soviet propaganda).
225. See, e.g., Clark Clifford, American Relations with the Soviet Union (Sept. 24,
1946), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/coldwar/
documents/index.php?documentdate= 946-09-24&documentid=4-l &studycollectionid=
&pagenumber-I (emphasizing that the United States needed to demonstrate, on the
world stage, that "capitalism is at least the equal of communism"). Particularly
emblematic of this tension was the situation of African-American singer Paul Robeson,
whose comments on the world stage concerning race-relations in the United States
threatened the United States' attempts to distinguish itself as ideologically superior to the
Soviet Union. Vern Smith, I Am At Home, Says Robeson at Reception in Soviet Union,
THE DAILY WORKER, Jan. 15, 1935. Enamored with his visit to Stalinist Russia in the
mid-1930s, he emphasized what he felt was the difference between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. In the former, he claimed, his success and recognition was merely "a
condescending exception" to the rule of "Jim-Crowism." In the latter, he stated, "the
Soviet theory is that all races are equal-really equal," and "[t]his is home to me." Id.
226. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment rationale for limiting
hate speech, arguments have been advanced that prohibition of such speech, at least with
respect to discrimination based upon race, is permitted under the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of badges and incidents of slavery, as articulated in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). For an interesting discussion of this perspective, see
Harvard Law Review Association, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A. V. v. St.
Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992).
227. See ALLPORT, supra note 222 at 49-51.
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Gordon Allport, active during this era, characterized societal toleration of
hate speech, or "antilocution" as the first step on a scale of prejudice, the
extreme end of which is extermination.228 Allport examined antilocution
largely in socio-psychological terms.2 2 9 His findings, however, justified
legal limitations on hate speech because of its deleterious societal effects
under a Schenck-Chaplinsky framework that contextualized and assigns
societal value to speech.230
3. Direct Regulation of Hate Speech Rejected
Nevertheless, the cases surrounding anti-Semitic marches in Illinois
during the late 1970s illustrate the Court's rejection of using the defense
of the right of equal protection as an absolute justification for proscribing
hate speech. 23 1 First, the Court decided National Socialist Party of
America v. Village of Skokie, 2 32 overturning an Illinois Supreme Court
stay that had prohibited a neo-Nazi march.23 3 The following year, in
Smith v. Collin,234 after the Seventh Circuit declared unconstitutional a
municipal law prohibiting distribution of materials which encouraged
hatred toward individuals of specific ethnic backgrounds, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of Justices Blackmun and
White. 235 The practical and theoretical implications of these decisions
were not lost on the justices. Although the dissenters primarily argued a
circuit split rationale for hearing the case, they also pointed out that the
denial of certiorari effectively affirmed an absolute protection of freedom
of speech, ignoring a realistic possibility that "taunting and
overwhelmingly offensive" speech might justify a contextual limit on
grounds similar to that expressed in Schenck.236 The dissenters felt that
the possibility of such a limit was worthy of exploration, because of the
"sensitivity" involved in the case.237 Nevertheless, the majority's denial
of certiorari signaled its repudiation of this analysis.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 51 (finding that intense antilocution will likely be related to open
discrimination and violence, and stating that it is "almost certain" to be backed up by
discriminatory action).
231. See, e.g., Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 516 (1978); National Socialist Party of
America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
232. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
233. Id.
234. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 516 (1978).
235. Id. See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1978)
(providing factual background of dispute).
236. Collin, 439 U.S. at 919 (1978) (Blackmun and White, JJ., dissenting).
237. Id. at 918.
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Following these cases, although bare regulation of hate speech
under an equal protection framework was considered inappropriate, the
possibility remained open for regulation and proscription via other
means. One of these avenues was the concept of hate speech as related
to action, which has presented the Court with some difficulty. The
discord between the majority opinion and concurrence in R.A. V v. St.
Paul2 38 crystallized this tension.2 39
4. R.A.V. and Black: Testing the Basis for Indirect Regulation of
Hate Speech
In R.A. V, which addressed the constitutionality of a St. Paul,
Minnesota city ordinance, the "St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance," the Supreme Court found that the ordinance was facially
invalid under the First Amendment.240 Significantly, the Court arrived at
a distinction between "content-based" prohibitions of speech, which are
"presumptively invalid," and "categorical" prohibitions, which may be
related according to their "constitutionally proscribed content." 2 4 1
Within this analytical framework, the Court held the ordinance to be
unconstitutional.242 The Court found that the ordinance did not regulate
speech on a categorical basis. 2 4 3  Rather, it distinguished within a
particular category ("fighting words," or, within the language of the
statute, speech "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others") on a content-based
determination (on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
(emphasis added)).24 According to the majority, proscribable speech, if
it is to be proscribed at all, must be proscribed without respect to its
245
target. Comparing fighting words to a "noisy sound truck," the Court
emphasized that the noise, due to its disruptive quality, can be regulated;
but it cannot be regulated with respect to the underlying content of its
message.24 6
238. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
239. See generally id.
240. Id. at 379-80.
241. Id. at 383-84. The Court here emphasized, contrary to some interpretations of
Chaplinsky, that such speech is, in fact, speech (not Constitutionally invisible) but that it
was capable of regulation, as in the case of obscenity. Id. at 383. This nuance has
implications for the utility of qualitative value alone as a framework for justifying
governmental interference with speech.
242. Id. at 383-84.
243. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 377.
244. Id. at 380-382.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 386 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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This distinction was not reached unanimously, and certainly not
without criticism. 24 7  Justices White and Stevens authored stinging
concurrences, which, although agreeing in the result on the basis that the
statute was overbroad, sought to repudiate much of the majority's
reasoning.248
Justice White's concurrence restates his view of the law as it stood
prior to R.A. V., a view based in Chaplinsky's notions of value: put
simply, certain speech is "worthless or of de minimis value to society."24 9
Justice Stevens agreed that there was, indeed, a traditional hierarchy of
protected speech, with "core political speech" ranking first, followed by
commercial and non-obscene, sexually explicit speech, with obscenity
and fighting words at the end of the list.250 The Stevens concurrence,
moreover, attacks the distinction within categorization, finding that it
turns the hierarchy of protection on its head by permitting obscenity and
fighting words that would otherwise be proscribable. 2 5 1 The majority
approach, according to Stevens, "sacrifices subtlety for clarity,"
disallowing nuanced decision making to address community-specific
problems. 2 52 Rather than a content-based analysis, which he felt was
permissible given that words must be understood in context, Justice
Stevens' concurrence evokes the classical distinction between subject-
matter-based and viewpoint-based discrimination.2 53 According to his
reasoning, although subject-matter based regulation can often, in effect,
regulate a particular viewpoint, this alone is not Constitutionally
problematic.25 4 Justice Stevens' concurrence points out a number of
"safe harbors" expressed in the majority opinion to demonstrate its
perceived unworkability.25 5 For example, Stevens argues that obscenity
prohibition, contextualized as to market, is no different than prohibiting
cross-burning in sensitive neighborhoods.256 The majority, on the other
hand, argues that such prohibition is Constitutionally acceptable, in that
it is not-content based.25 7 Indeed, consistent with Allport's psychological
structure, the petitioner's brief referred to burning a cross as the "first
step in an act of assault."258
247. Id. at 416.
248. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 416.
249. Id. at 400 (White, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring).
253. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 397, 420, 430 (citing numerous cases).
254. Id. at 432.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 419 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring)
257. Id. at 387.
258. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 432 n.8 (Stevens, White, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring,
citing Appellate Brief for Petitioner).
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Accordingly, this case left several unanswered questions: Even if
hate speech, under the guise of "fighting words," could not be regulated
as to insular, discrete minority groups, could it be regulated generally?
Under Justice Stevens' analysis, which he noted was not addressed by
the Court, could hate speech be regulated, under the "fighting words
doctrine," on a danger-based continuum? 2 59
With respect to the latter question, some clarification came in
Virginia v. Black.260 In Black, a fractured Court again addressed the
constitutionality of prohibiting cross-burning. 261 Here, the Court
emphasized yet another distinction, that of "true threats," characterized
as "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."262 True threats, according
to the Court, are not protected speech, and can be regulated to prevent
the materialization of intimidation or actual violence.263
In Black, cross-burning was characterized as just such a true threat,
and susceptible of proscription. 2 64 The court distinguished this ruling
from R.A. V. on the grounds that, in R.A. V, the statute at issue sought to
discriminate against speech that was hostile with respect to a particular
topic. 2 65 There, anti-racist speech was prohibited, but other, equally
virulent speech was not prohibited.26 6 For example, threats against
persons based on "political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality."267 Simply put, the Virginia statute passed constitutional
muster because "it doesn't matter [why] an individual burns a cross,"
provided that there is intent to intimidate.26 8 Such regulation did not run
afoul of the First Amendment because, under the "true threats" doctrine,
it sought to prohibit "only those forms of intimidation that are most
likely to inspire fear of bodily harm."269
Nevertheless, a plurality in Black found the statute unconstitutional,
not because of its prohibition of cross burning with intent to intimidate,
but because of a provision that declared that cross burning was prima
facie evidence of intimidation.27 0 With this provision included, the cross-
259. Id. at 419, n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
260. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); R.A.V. v. City of
Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
263. Black, 538 U.S. at 343.
264. See id. at 362.
265. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
266. See id.
267. Id. (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 363.
270. Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
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burning prohibition was overbroad and could serve as an unconstitutional
attempt at chilling political speech.2 7 1 According to the plurality, the
"First Amendment does not permit ... a shortcut" around finding intent
to intimidate to fit within the "true threats" doctrine.272 Speech can be
prohibited, but only after a contextual analysis. This holding was not
universally acclaimed, with Justice Stevens, in a concurrence, criticizing
the plurality's interpretation of "prima facie" evidence, and arguing that
the unconstitutional provision should have been upheld.273 A
concurrence and dissent by Justice Souter, which argued for the
invalidation of the statute as an unconstitutional categorical distinction,
and a dissent by Justice Thomas argued that the statute permissibly
regulates conduct, and that First Amendment concerns of expression play
no role in the analysis. 27 4
5. Alternative Methods of Regulating Hate Speech
Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 has also served as an
indirect avenue for regulation of hate speech. 7 Title VII provides
protection from harassment to employees on the basis of race, sex, color,
national origin or religion.27 6 This protection was extended to situations
in which the workplace sexual harassment creates "an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." 2 77  Under this "hostile
environment" theory of harassment, an avenue has been opened to
prosecute hate speech on an effects-test basis.278
This test was enunciated more clearly in Harris v. Forkhft Systems,
Inc.,279 in which the Court set forth guidelines for determining what
constituted actual harassment under a hostile environment standard.280
To reach the standard, the Court articulated the necessity of workplace
"permeat[ion] with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment."28' In so
doing, the Court set out what it considered the "middle path between
271. Id.
272. Id. at 367.
273. Id. at 368 (Stevens, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 388
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
275. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e (2006).
276. Id.
277. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing the EEOC
guidelines at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)).
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making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury." 282 The Court required
that the conduct create an environment that is both objectively and
subjectively hostile and abusive.2 83 Although varied tests have been
applied to determine whether a hostile environment has been created,
courts agree that it is a fact-centered and case-specific analysis.2 84
Hate speech has also been regulated using other methods.
Institutional speech codes are one such method. The campus speech
codes debate raged during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 2 85 During this
period, attempts by institutions to regulate hate speech that was
considered detrimental to fostering an open, effective academic
community were regularly struck down by courts.2 86 At the base, the
regulations were struck down as violative of the "marketplace of ideas"
principle of free speech as first set out by Holmes in Abrams.87
Accordingly, such regulations were struck down as overbroad in Doe v.
288University of Michigan. Moreover, attempts to limit hate speech at an
institutional level, on the basis of the "fighting words" exception to
unprotected speech, were not upheld in UWM Post v. Board of
Regents. 289 The court in UWM Post drew a difference between "hostile"
speech and speech that "tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the
peace," finding that not all of the first kind of speech, which was
regulated, was equivalent to the second kind of speech, which could be
regulated.2 90
In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,2 9 1 a speech code was
overruled because it failed to account for speech that was uttered with a
282. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
2 8 3. Id.
284. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991). This case,
ironically, speculated that an employer's authorization of a cross burning on the premises
by the Ku Klux Klan would "doubtless give rise to the employer's liability for racial
harassment under Title VII." Id. at 1274 n.4. Cf Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
(invalidating a provision of a law prohibiting cross-burning which permitted the act of
cross burning to be used as prima facie evidence of discrimination). Thus, the tension
between freedom of speech and equal protection is shown: An action which might be
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment might be prohibited in the
workplace context under Title VII.
285. For an excellent discussion of the campus speech codes debate, see generally
TIMOTHY J. SHIELL, supra note 220 (reviewing the salient cases, the interrelation of Title
VII hostile environment claims, and arguing for a proactive, rather than reactive,
approach to regulation of campus speech).
286. SHIELL, supra note 220, at 90-91.
287. SHIELL, supra note 220, at 73.
288. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
289. UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
290. Id. at 1172-73.
291. Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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non-offensive intent and speech that was uttered with the intent to create
an offensive environment.292 Such regulations could be interpreted
subjectively and constitute an overbroad prohibition of speech.29 3
Most recently, hate speech has been legislated against in very
specific contexts. The activities of Fred Phelps, pastor of the Westboro
Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, and his followers, created enormous
unrest following the beginning of the Second Iraq War in 2003.294 Long
a controversial figure for his outspoken protests against homosexuality,
Phelps and his followers began picketing the funerals of fallen U.S.
soldiers during the Second Iraq War.295 Phelps and his church,
consisting mostly of the members of his family, justified their belief with
the rationale that the deceased soldiers had died in support of the cause
of the United States, which they denounced with vile epithets.296
In response to these actions, the "Respect for America's Fallen
Heroes Act" was passed by Congress and signed by the President on
May 29, 2006.297 It prohibited any protests within 150 feet of a road
leading into any cemetery under control of the National Cemetery
Administration, or within 300 feet of the cemetery impeding access to
the cemetery, during a period beginning 60 minutes prior to, and
concluding 60 minutes following, a funeral.298
In addition to the federal act, at least thirty-five states have passed
statutes banning the protests in some form.299 In Maine, the debate over
the enactment of such a law weighed varying viewpoints, trying to
balance free speech, security interests, and "human decency." 300 The
Maine statute included elements common to most other state attempts to
address this problem.30 1 Protests at funerals were to be limited with
respect to distance and time.302 The restrictions were justified on the
basis of security interests. 303 Several of these statutes have undergone
292. Id. at 482.
293. Id.
294. Michael Sangiacomo, Preaching Pain Sect Damns America and its Heroes, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, 0.), Dec. 8, 2006, at B9.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
298. Id.
299. David Klepper, Kansas Ban on Funeral Protests Gets Blocked, THE KANSAS
CITY STAR, Mar. 12, 2008, at Al.
300. Ann S. Kim, Legislators Weigh Ban on Protests at Funerals, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Maine), Feb. 9, 2007, at Al.
301. Id.
302. Id. These limitations seem to be tailored to survive the lower, rational-basis
review of restrictions that apply merely to the "time, place, or manner" of speech, as
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court challenges. For example, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an injunction against the
enforcement of such a state law in Missouri.304 The matter has not yet
been reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Beyond state and federal legislative invention, the controversial
speech has been addressed by private court action. Following the
picketing of the funeral of his son, who had been killed in Iraq, in March,
2006, Albert Snyder filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland. 305  As the case proceeded, Mr. Snyder asserted
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy
by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy to commit these acts against
the Westboro Baptist Church and three of its leaders.306 Following a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on these three counts, damages were
awarded in the amount of $2.9 million, with $8 million in punitive
damages.30 7 Upon motion for remittitur, the amount of punitive damages
was reduced to $2.1 million.3 08
Following the judgment, liens were placed on the Westboro Baptist
Church and the law office owned by the Rev. Fred Phelps. 30 9 According
to a newspaper interview with Mr. Snyder's attorney, filing for
bankruptcy could prevent collection of the compensatory damages, but
would not permit the discharge of the punitive damages.310
In addition to legal remedies to meet the unique challenge posed by
the Phelps' funeral protests, individuals have developed solutions to this
311issue. One group, the "Patriot Guard," which claims some 60,000
members, was created with the specific purpose of traveling to the
funerals of soldiers in order to "establish a buffer of steel and humanity,"
and thwart the attempts of Phelps' followers to protest the funerals.3 12
By its own account, the group met with enormous success in the first few
months of its existence, providing comfort to dozens of families. 13
According to Craig Hensen, one of the co-founders of the group, "We
did see that our presence irritated the Phelpses." 3 14
304. Injunction on Protest Law Needed, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Dec. 10,
2007, at IB.
305. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-70 (D.Md. 2008).
306. Id. at 571.
307. Id. at 573.
308. Id. at 597.
309. Mike Hall, Walls Close in on Phelpses, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Apr. 4,
2008, at IA.
310. Id.
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ANALYSIS
1I. SUMMATION OF THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL VIEWPOINT
The present state of American Constitutional jurisprudence presents
unique challenges for issues of hate speech. The historical development
of blasphemy regulation within broader European-American society
reveals the strength of an interest in proscribing speech to protect the
315community. This protection was originally done literally, by
sustaining the legitimacy of the state's foundations, in terms of a
Gregorian church-state system, and later, in the national-church setting.
By the time blasphemy regulation reached the United States, however, it
was already uprooted from its original foundation. As the notion of the
essence of the state had evolved, the means for its preservation also
evolved. At this point, blasphemy regulation was justified as a means of
public security.3 16 An underlying assumption of common American
social viewpoints justified blasphemy regulation to prevent breaches of
the peace.3 17
A unique counterargument prioritized the freedom of speech and the
free exercise of religion. 18 This argument set forth that, in a marketplace
of ideas, the best outcome would ultimately triumph and would be
enriched by its competition with lesser values.31 9 Therefore, the existing
social order could be preserved without proscriptive regulation. 320
Although this argument was initially eschewed in favor of a protectionist
approach, it ultimately competed with the protectionist approach for
recognition. 321 An emphasis on the equality of individuals, expressed
during and after the Civil War, was enshrined within the Constitution in
the form of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 322
Within this heightened tension between the value of individual
expression and the value of a peaceful society an uneasy gray area
developed. As expressed by Justice Holmes in Abrams, the debate
tipped in the direction of protection of freedom of speech.32 3 The
Fourteenth Amendment, that great symbol of equality, was used to apply
the Bill of Rights to the states in a series of cases that showed that its
315. See supra Part I.A for the background of this development.
316. See generally Chandler, 1837 WL 154.
317. See generally id.
318. See LEVY, supra note 31 at 327.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837)
(discussing the merits of the relative positions).
322. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV.
323. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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promise of equality could best be expressed in an equal opportunity on
the part of all to participate in the marketplace of ideas. 324
As part of this reordering around the marketplace of ideas,
blasphemy regulation died a gradual, almost imperceptible death, from
want of prosecution. 32 It was dealt its final blow under the guise of
overturning a state law permitting censorship of sacrilegious films in
1952.326 When the Court ended blasphemy regulation, they did not do so
in an unqualified affirmation of the marketplace of ideas.327 Rather, the
Court used statistical evidence to support its finding that, with a
pluralistic society, the United States could not practically provide
protection from the threat of offensive religious language. 328 Indeed, the
court found that such language was no longer a threat in part because of
this religious pluralism. 3 2 9 Blasphemy's weakness was not so much that
it constituted a limitation on speech, but that it could no longer be
squarely defined in light of shifting social perspectives.330
Accordingly, where a common social ideology remained, some
measure of protectionism could be adopted in its favor. Overwhelming
support for a non-violent society led to the affirmation of the "fighting
words doctrine."3 Common objections to prurient speech and a
consensus to protect the young from certain content led to the affirmation
of obscenity regulation.3 32 The marketplace of ideas was not completely
unfettered.
To place limitations on certain categories of speech requires some
implicit assumptions. The first assumption is that speech can be
categorized. The second assumption, which closely parallels the first, is
that categories of speech can be ranked in terms of social value. These
assumptions make the type of discussions in R.A. V possible. 33  That is,
they demonstrate that attempts to value speech, beyond a few
commonsense reference points, such as fighting words, leads to
enormous disagreement and confusion about the bases for analysis.334
324. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 397 (1931) (applying the First
Amendment freedom of the press to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applying the First Amendment freedom of
speech to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
325. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 530-31.
329. See id.
330. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 530-3 1.
331. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
332. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
333. See generally R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
334. See generally id.
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This confusion led to a balancing analysis, in which First
Amendment protections, although weighted, were balanced against other
Constitutional rights. One of these rights, the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection, arose as a formidable contender to trump
the First Amendment in close cases.
Enter "hate speech." As the United States grew increasingly
sensitive, for political and strategic reasons, to its reputation in the
international sphere, the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment were given a role in American jurisprudence that they had
not enjoyed since the Reconstruction era. 3 The Fourteenth Amendment
served not merely as a portal to ensure the application of other
constitutional rights, but it arose as a distinct constitutional value in
itself.33 7  The corresponding acknowledgement of the benefits of
pluralism and diversity forged a common social value worthy of
338
protection. In terms of a balancing analysis, it made little sense that
the freedom of speech, protected as it was by the Fourteenth Amendment
with respect to state action, could be used to destroy that Amendment's
meaning.33 9 In other words, constitutional language that recognized
certain rights needed protection against the abuse of those rights.340
Although courts have generally exercised their deference to First
Amendment preeminence in hate speech cases, this deference has been
far from absolute. 34 ' Generally, laws directly restricting hate speech,
whether outright prohibitions or more nuanced institutional speech
codes, have not been upheld. 342  A distinction was drawn between
categorical discrimination and viewpoint-based discrimination.343
Accordingly, the societal consensus concerning the regulation of
obscenity is expressed as a defense of the interests of the children and the
more vulnerable in society.344
335. See generally id.
336. See supra Part I.B.
337. See Richard L. Wiener and Erin Richter, Symbolic Hate: Intention to Intimidate,
Ideology and Group Association, 32 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 463 (2008) (identifying the
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment in recognizing a substantive social value of
equal protection).
338. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952).
339. See SHIELL, supra note 220, at 2.
340. See id.
341. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992).
342. See generally SHIELL, supra note 220.
343. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 383-84.
344. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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The societal consensus against inequality has already justified
regulation of hate speech in several forms.34 5 Some kinds of hate speech,
such as cross-burning, can be proscribed when there is intent to
intimidate.346 In an odd attempt to reconcile a hierarchy of speech values
with First Amendment protections, the speech cannot be expressly
limited as to a specific target.347 Nevertheless, it can be implicitly
348limited as to that target. A similar limitation is found in the hostile
environment theory under Title VII, regulating speech in the workplace
when it cumulatively creates a hostile environment toward a member of a
minority group. 349
For all that has been said about the value of the First Amendment
and the marketplace of ideas, the belief remains strong that society's core
values will not always triumph in the marketplace of ideas, and require
external protection.3 0  Beyond the margins of extremity, a lack of
confidence that positive values will ultimately overcome negative ones,
given a fundamentally fair marketplace, justify a broad scope for these
- * 351limitations.
Like the regulation of blasphemy, limitations on funeral protests are
based in preserving the public peace. 35 2 Like obscenity regulation, these
regulations are based in shielding the vulnerable from unwanted
messages. 353 At their root, however, such limitations were passed in
response to a specific social outrage.354 They are fundamentally justified
by a conception that the good is not always capable of defending itself;
that values of tolerance and equality need external statutory protection
from inappropriate verbal attacks. Such statutes implicitly assign value
to speech, and acknowledge that market forces, expressed in terms of
lawsuits and even the "Patriot Guard Riders" are not enough to compete
against "bad speech." 5 It remains unclear whether these laws will
withstand judicial scrutiny.
In cases such as these, the United States stands at a crossroads. As
has been seen, even given the United States' strong deference to First
Amendment values, a myriad of tools is available to regulate unwanted
345. See Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 377.
346. See Black, 538 U.S. at 343.
347. See id. at 380-82.
348. See id.
349. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e (2006); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264
(7th Cir. 1991).
350. See SHIELL, supra note 220 at 1-4.
351. See id.
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speech under other forms.356 It is therefore not enough to say that hate
speech cannot be regulated in the United States, or that the freedom of
speech always, or even traditionally, trumps competing constitutional
values. Accordingly, whether such regulation is appropriate, or even
necessary, in terms of hate speech, and, if so, to what extent, is a value
judgment. This value judgment is based not in terms of being "for" or
"against" hate speech, but rather in how one perceives society and the
role of the state in relationship to that society. The history of blasphemy
jurisprudence provides powerful knowledge that informs this judgment.
There are three basic alternatives as one approaches the question of
addressing hate speech. The first can be called traditionalist paternalism,
and it reflects the ideology of the state as representative of a theological
or ideological universe. An offense against that theology or ideology is
therefore an offense against the state, for the state depends upon the
external body of thought for its legitimacy.357 In a traditionalist
paternalistic state approach to hate speech, the offensive speech is treated
like blasphemy; not only is not tolerated, it is severely punished as
treasonous in order to preserve the legitimacy of the state.358
The second alternative, called modernistic paternalism, reflects the
identity of the state as guardian of elite ideals which might become
contaminated or distorted if left to individual market forces. Although
viewed as the good, these values are acknowledged as delicate and
subject to undesired manipulation. Accordingly, the state is perceived as
a beneficent parent to the people, preserving their welfare and
eliminating conflict to maximize social contentment and protect popular
values.
The third alternative, called libertarianism, defines the state as
facilitator, rather than corrector, of the marketplace of ideas. This
approach acknowledges the ideals of Furneaux to their fullest extent, and
affirms that competition in the marketplace of ideas will produce the
356. See supra Part I.B.
357. One should not make the mistake of relegating the potency of traditionalist
paternalism to the European Middle Ages on the basis of the European experience with
blasphemy. It survives in forms as varied as Islamic theocratic regimes and the remnants
of Soviet-style Communism. Compare Philip Hoyle et al., Ayatollah Revives the Death
Fatwa on Salman Rushdie, TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 2005 (showing relationship between
religious edict and governmental policy) with FERDINAND JOSEPH MARIA FELDBRUGGE ET
AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 343-44 (1985) (identifying "defamation" of "Soviet
political .. . system" as punishable in former USSR with "six months to seven years with
or without exile"). This comment does not presuppose to address the consequences of
the expression of this ideology across such varied regimes, but it is important to note that
this conception of the role of the state transcends any given ideological or historical
perspective, and remains a viable force in the community of nations today.
358. See Zahid Hussain, Journalist Sentenced to Life for Blasphemy, THE TIMES
(London), Jul. 10, 2003.
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best, and most enduring, result. 35 9 In absolute libertarianism, the state
functions merely as a facilitator to ensure that speech is not hindered. In
qualified libertarianism, the state functions as facilitator but also
regulates at the margins. This alternative asserts that the marketplace of
ideas is generally reliable as a catalyst for determining social values, but
that excesses on either side of equilibrium should be controlled at the
margins.
Some elements of all of these conceptions of the state are present in
the varied U.S. jurisprudence on the subject, and this is partially why the
case law is confusing in some respects. A traditionalist paternalist
model, or even a modernist paternalism model, invites considerations of
social values in regulating hate speech. The judiciary, much as in
blasphemy of old and currently with respect to obscenity, is an arbiter of
value. This approach justifies regulation in terms of its effect on society,
much as blasphemy was regulated during the 1 9 th century, and obscenity
is regulated today. This type of protectionism requires intense judicial
oversight and a proactive assignment of value to categories of speech.
Such oversight was rejected in a blasphemy context, because of its
impracticality in the face of religious pluralism.36 0 It was upheld in an
obscenity context, because enough social consensus existed to make it
workable.36 1
Depending on how hate speech is viewed in terms of the legitimacy
of the state, either paradigm could be followed to varying degrees.
Although outright prohibition seems incompatible with previous
decisions, these could be reversed. Without going to such an extreme,
exceptions could be carved out, similar to the fighting words doctrine
and, like obscenity, based on societal protection. This approach has
already been taken to an extent.362
If the United States adopts the third alternative, such undesirable
speech could be regulated minimally or not at all, leaving it to market
forces to eliminate undesirable speech and positively affect desirable
values. This market oversight could take the form of private actions to
remedy excessive conduct, such as tort actions and the formation of
groups to promote an alternative viewpoint. In such a context, the state
would serve as facilitator of speech, ensuring that the ability to share
ideas was not hindered. If a qualified libertarian approach is adopted, the
state could justify the regulation at the margins, such as cross-buming
359. See generally LEVY, supra note 31.
360. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952).
361. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
362. See supra Part I.B.
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that attempts to intimidate, while still affirming a fundamental belief in
the marketplace of ideas.
III. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS
In order to see how each of the above approaches might actually
work, it is helpful to review concrete alternatives of each alternative in
other nations.
A. Traditionalist Paternalism
It is difficult to find a surviving traditionalist paternalistic regime in
lands overwhelmingly influenced by western thought. This worldview
today is most prominently represented by nations which strictly follow
some form of shari'a law.363 Most notably, Pakistan's penal code, which
proscribes a sentence of death for blasphemy, is noted as among the
strictest in the world in this regard. M Important comparisons can be
drawn between this approach and what a traditional paternalist model to
hate speech regulation might look like. The Pakistani approach
advocates a method of statist control similar to that emphasized in
European blasphemy regimes during the period prior to and immediately
following the Protestant Reformation. 3 65 As demonstrated above, such
an approach is grounded in a worldview that draws upon a particular
theology or ideology, in this case Islam, as the explanation for, and
foundation of, the state's existence. An offense against this foundation is
an offense against the state itself, which indicates why the draconian
punishments for blasphemy in such regimes hold sway. This theological
values system provides both order and a method of maintenance for the
state. As stated above, such regulations, although outwardly religious in
character, have far more to do with the maintenance of political regimes
than, ultimately, with theological concerns. It is for this reason that
Siddique and Hayat point out that the blasphemy laws of Pakistan have
363. Shari'a is a generally accepted descriptor term for Islamic religious law, a
comprehensive system of law governing all aspects of Muslim life. Its precise definition
in terms of practical application, however, is unclear. For a good overview of this
concept and a comparison of its application in numerous countries, see Ted Stahnke and
Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or
Belief A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim
Countries, 36 GEO. J. IN'TL L. 947 (2005).
364. See generally Osama Siddique and Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Unholy
Laws in Pakistan-Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications,
17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 303 (2008) (providing excellent overview of impact of blasphemy
laws in Pakistan and their relationship to authoritarian regime).
365. Compare id. (demonstrating the identification of blasphemy as a crime against
the state in Pakistan) with LEVY, supra note 31, at 80 (recounting the state's role in
administering punishment for the crime of blasphemy).
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been used to prevent a "breach of the peace."3 66 In this type of regime,
however, speech-curtailing legislation is designed to do more than
prevent a breach of the peace and to maintain the leadership of one or
more authoritarian figures, although it often has this effect. It is designed
to maintain the ideology which is the primary foundation of, and
explanation for, the state's very existence. Traditionalist paternalism
regimes presume that the guardianship of the state's existence cannot be
entrusted to its people, but that challenges to its foundation must be
avoided, at best, or eliminated, at worst, but dealt with decisively at all
cost to freedom. It is not enough to say that in such regimes the value of
preserving the public peace trumps that of freedom of speech. It is more
appropriate to characterize such regimes as using all tools necessary to
perpetuate their own existence. Whether one views the state as the
secular arm of God, as in medieval Europe, or the state as the Ummah,
the community of all who live subject to Shari'ah law as derived from
the Qur'an and the Sunnah,367 the justification for blasphemy legislation
as the protection of the raison d'etre for the state is essentially the same.
Whatever the practical motivation is for such a justification, the
principles are closely aligned.
B. Modernist Paternalism
The most high-profile modernist paternalistic regimes, with respect
to hate speech, are Canada and Sweden. The Canadian criminal code
provides punishment not only for "incite[ment] of hatred . .. likely to
lead to a breach of the peace," 36 8 but also for "every one who . . . wilfully
promotes hatred against any identifiable group."3 69 Although the statute
provides for an exception for those who "in good faith" based their
statement on "a religious subject" or in "a religious text," 37 0 it has not
been implemented without controversy, particularly with respect to its
366. Siddique and Hayat, supra note 364, at 307.
367. See Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Explanatory Notes, 1(b),
available at http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.htm [hereinafter "Islamic
Declaration"]; Islamic Declaration art. XXIII. It is important to note that there is some
dispute over the extent of the concept of Ummah, which is defined in the Islamic
Declaration as "World Muslim Community"; some would extend this concept to the
extent of the original Islamic caliphate, and include all subjects, whatever religion, within
its authority, basing their argument on the Dustur al-Madinah (Medina Constitution) of
622. See, e.g., Dustur al-Madinah, Art. 25, available at http://www.constitution-.org/
cons/medina/conmedina.htm (stating that "the Jews of the B'Auf are one community
with the believers.").
368. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, § 319(1) (1985).
369. Id. § 319(2) (1985).
370. Id. § 319(3)(b) (1985).
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2005 amendment to include "sexual orientation" as a classification for
hate speech.
Likewise, the Swedish government, with its "Act on Persecution of
Minority Groups," passed in 2002, criminalized hate speech against a
number of minority groups. 37 2  The conviction under this law of
Pentecostal Pastor Ake Green, who preached a sermon condemning
homosexuality on June 20, 2003, was the subject of intense international
interest.3 7 3 The conviction and sentence of one month in prison was
ultimately overturned on appeal to the Gota Court of Appeal on Feb. 12,
2005, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Sweden on Nov. 29,
2005.374 In its opinion, the Swedish Supreme Court relied on
commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of expression
guaranteed under the European Constitution, and the European Court's
guidelines for determining the legitimacy of a restriction on speech.375
These guidelines include "whether the restriction meets a pressing social
need, whether it is proportionate to the legitimate purpose to be achieved,
and whether the reasons asserted by the national authorities to justify it
are relevant and sufficient." 37 6 The Court found that the European Court
would likely find that while restrictions on hate speech were appropriate,
in light of the European Convention on Human Rights' emphasis on the
importance of religious freedom and the freedom of speech, a restriction
on Pastor Green's speech would likely be found to be disproportionate
and therefore invalid.377
In both of these instances, modernist paternalistic states permit
enhanced limitations on the freedom of speech, particularly with respect
to hate speech, as threats to the stability of society. The legitimization of
this regulation is not based, as it is in traditionally paternalistic states, on
some external source for the legitimacy of the state qua state. Rather, it
is based in a preservation of the state's fundamental values as determined
371. See MPs Extend Hate Crime Protection, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Sept.
17, 2003. See also Rob Moll, Weblog: The Bible as Canadian Hate Literature,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/-
2004/aprilweb-only/4-28-42.0.html.
372. Lagen om hets mot folkgrupp (Svensk f6rfattning-ssamling [SFS] 2002:800)
(Swed.).
373. See, e.g., Keith B. Richburg, Swedish Hate Verdict Reversed, Sermon
Condemning Homosexuals Ruled Not Covered by Law, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 12,
2005; World Briefing/ Sweden: Pastor's 'Hate Speech' Conviction Quashed, NEW YORK
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005.
374. Supreme Court of Sweden, Ake Green case, 2005-11-29 p. 14 (Swed.), available
at http://www.domstol.se/-Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2005/Dompa
engelska B_1050-05.pdf (English translation).
375. Id.
376. Id. (citing Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1979)).
377. Id. at 16.
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democratically. Unlike traditional paternalism, which views the state as
justified apart from its people, in modernist paternalism the state exists
directly for the benefit of its people. Modernist paternalism emphasizes
the collective above the individual. Hate speech can therefore be
criminalized, not because it necessarily threatens the foundation of the
state itself, but because it prohibits what the state as a democratically
legitimate institution has determined is in the best interests of the
development of its people.37 8 Nuanced exceptions to the outright
prohibitions, as in the case of religious speech in Canada and the ultimate
decision of the Swedish Supreme Court, supra, recognize that freedom of
speech has a very important role to play within a democratic society.379
Accordingly, restrictions on hate speech can be justified on the basis of
"preventing disorder or crime, as well as to protect a person's good name
or reputation."380 The state as guardian of the safety of its citizens is the
paramount object of modernist paternalism.
C. Libertarianism
The United States possesses perhaps the purest example of a
libertarian regime. As discussed exhaustively, the United States initially
inherited an early form of modernist paternalism. 381 With respect to
many forms of speech, including blasphemy regulation, the United States
has generally embraced the idea that an emphasis on free speech is not a
mere social value, but operates as a transcending force to enable the
development of societal values.382
This view of speech was emphasized in the overturning of
blasphemy regulation and rose to prominence throughout the 2 0 'h
century.383 The "marketplace of ideas" concept primarily defined the
state as marketplace facilitator. Nevertheless, as pointed about above,
the emphasis on free speech had notable exceptions, such as obscenity
378. This giving over of power draws strongly on the idea that the people, in forming
a state, create "something greater than the sum of its parts," to rule over them. See
generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1651). See also
Supreme Court of Sweden, Ake Green case, 2005-11-29 p. 10 (Swed.), available at
http://www.do-mstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2005/Dom-pa-
engelskaB_1050-05.pdf (English translation) (enumerating limitations on freedom of
speech and adding, "To this list may be added the principle that this freedom may
otherwise be limited if especially important reasons justify this.").
379. See MPs Extend Hate Crime Protection, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 17, 2003.
See also Supreme Court of Sweden, Ake Green case, 2005-11-29 p. 10 (Swed.), available
at http://www.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2005/Dom .pa_
engelskaB 1 050-05.pdf (English translation).
380. Id. at i1.
381. See supra Part I.
382. See supra Part I.
383. See supra Part I.A.
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and other speech which overtly created undesirable social effects.3 8 4
Although Furneaux's market-based arguments have been given their
greatest practical application in the United States, they have not been
completely triumphant. The role of the state as guardian is seen in these
exceptions. They stand for the affirmation that the state has a credible
power to prevent marginal influences which would thwart the
mechanism of free speech in contributing to the development of society.
Within this qualified libertarian approach, the state's power to
circumscribe the influence of speech is weakened, but remains. The
difference from a modernist paternalistic state is one of degree, rather
than kind. It is simply a variance in the degree to which the state is
willing to make allowance for speech of marginal value in terms of its
objectives. In the libertarian model, the state is seen as a reactive, rather
than a proactive force. It corrects excesses, and does not unduly
interfere. It provides for alternatives, such as lawsuits and even hostile
environment claims in the employment context, to incentivize behavior,
rather than directly regulating it. Although the United States
demonstrates what may best be described as a qualified libertarian
model, its approaches to obscenity and enabling of hate speech
proscription under limited circumstances display clear modernist
paternalistic tendencies.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
In a world increasingly defined by globalism, where competing
perspectives and statist self-definitions increasingly conflict and adapt to
each other, the United States has much to contribute to the debate. The
United States' cautious embrace of a qualified libertarian regime has
arguably been its greatest contribution to the world dialogue on speech
issues vis-A-vis the state's self-definition. This movement, however, may
be overcome by doubt and pressure to adapt more of the United States'
latent modernist paternalistic tendencies.
Although it may have been motivated by less than ideologically
pure reasons, such as the impracticality of regulation in a pluralistic
society, the American jurisprudence with respect to blasphemy
legislation has shown the world that Furneaux's arguments are
385fundamentally correct. Within the marketplace of ideas, truly strong,
valid ideas are able to compete and emerge victorious on a level playing
field. By and large, religious groups have not rioted in response to
blasphemous statements that have offended them. Rather, they have
channeled their energies into mounting effective counter-arguments and
384. See supra Part I.B.
385. See supra Part I.A.
2009] 615
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
seeking solutions through the democratic political process, enriching the
public debate.386
The beauty of a qualified libertarian approach to speech regulation
is that it says nothing about what a society's values should be. A society
is free to keep its traditional values, as it likes, or to exchange them for
others. This advantage was recognized as early as the decision in
Chandler in 1837.387 The state does not function as the guardian of the
substantive values of the people, so much as the process by which the
people determine these values for themselves. These values are stronger
and more authentic, as they have been determined rationally by their
adherents.
Just as the Court wisely recognized that plurality of religious
ideologies rendered moot the concern of public unrest about
blasphemous statements, 8 the Court should likewise place its faith that
the preeminent values of equality will survive in the ideological field of
combat, provided that the playing field is level. This leveling of the
playing field can allow for regulation of cross burning with intent to
intimidate, while at the same time preserving the right to express the
vilest of ideas in the confidence that they will be publicly repudiated. In
a recent example, the funeral protests have been dealt with effectively
completely apart from legislative solutions. 89 Private lawsuits,
opposition groups and tactics to deflect the groups' speech have
overwhelmed the undesirable speech and affirmed key social values
without the need to resort to statutory law.3 90
Furneaux correctly recognized that the maintenance of values by
force, as in blasphemy regulation, oppressed not only the people, but also
the development of the state and the integrity of the philosophy thus
"protected." 39 1 After a slow start, the United States began to cautiously
apply Furneaux's principles.392 By and large, they proved successful.
The "marketplace of ideas" concept was eventually accepted with
respect to blasphemy regulation. At its core, it argues that the most
important and sacred values among us are able to defend themselves
386. For a discussion of the heightened role of religious groups within contemporary
American political discourse, see generally CLYDE WILCOX AND CARIN LARSON, ONWARD
CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS: THE RELIGIOUs RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (3d ed. 2006).
387. See State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837), at *11
(affirming that a society can change its religious and ethical foundations as it pleases, and
that judges must be respectful of those sentiments in interpreting law).
388. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 509-14 (1952).
389. See supra Part II.B.
390. See Alvarez, supra note 7.
391. See LEVY, supra note 31 at 327.
392. See supra Part II.A.3.
393. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 509-14 (1952).
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against criticism and attack, and thereby become stronger. Active
government protection of freedom of speech interests facilitates this
process.
Taken as a whole, however, an absolute libertarian approach to
speech regulation is untenable. Some speech is inherently destructive,
such as the aphorism of yelling fire in a crowded theatre.394 This
destructiveness comes not from the idea, but from the effect that such
speech would universally produce. The element of actual harm to
disadvantaged groups by hate speech is part of this destructive capability.
If we are to accept the postulates of Allport, hate speech, particularly
when coupled with intimidatory intent as in Black, can be merely the first
step toward more harmful actions. 395
A qualified libertarian approach which recognizes a minimal role
for regulation at the margins to ensure the fairness of the marketplace of
ideas addresses this problem. Although it is tempting to blur the line
between qualified libertarianism and modernist paternalism in terms of
practical effect, they differ in their scope precisely because of their
ideological underpinnings. Qualified libertarianism retains the view that
the state is the facilitator of a free market in speech, which needs
occasional correction to enable the people to best determine their own
ideas. Modernist paternalism, on the other hand, views itself as the
guardian of those very ideas and regulates to protect the ideas
themselves.
The United States has shown from its experiment with blasphemy
regulation that modernist paternalism is an inefficient means of
promoting social values. 3 96  The previous attempt with blasphemy
required distinctions between popular and legal blasphemy.397 This
distinction was rife with subjective determinism. Such paternalism
forces an unwelcome, inorganic means of development on society, taking
it in a direction that it does not want to go, or perhaps is not ready to go.
In an attempt to protect underlying values, it neutralizes the very
advantages that, as has been shown, go hand-in-hand with freedom of
speech as paramount value.
Accordingly, experience has shown that a qualified libertarian
approach, which views the state as facilitator with power to correct errors
at the margins, is the most appropriate course to follow. This approach
encompasses soft regulation. Soft regulation includes enabling private
legal actions, and corrective actions within particularly sensitive areas,
394. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
395. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); ALLPORT, supra note 222 at 49-51.
396. See supra Part I.A.
397. See People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 290.
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such as regulating hate speech that clearly tends toward violence, and
encouraging the dissemination of counter opinions.
V. CONCLUSION
The success of the long-term American experiment in terms of
deregulating blasphemy and other speech, provided that there is some
baseline of value and that it is not inherently destructive, demonstrates
that the application of this model to hate speech is most in keeping with
the premises on which the American theory of governance and societal
evolution is based.
In the future, the United States must address how it will deal with
the concept of hate speech, which stands antithetical to the American
concept of equality, in light of an international consensus which
increasingly embraces proactive regulation of hate speech. The United
States' experience in dealing with blasphemy regulation, and its
pioneering legal and political model, provide insight into an appropriate
way to address the issue of hate speech.
The concept of blasphemy, which is rooted in religious belief,
became enshrined in European law during a period when the church and
state were seen as contemporary expressions of divine rule upon the
earth. As time passed, religious pluralism required this belief to be
modified, and blasphemy was justified first in terms of a moral
protectionism, and then in terms of promoting the public peace by
protecting offense against common values. Eventually, within the
United States, the idea, advanced by Philip Furneaux, that common
values would inevitably triumph in the marketplace of ideas, led to a
liberalized policy toward free speech in general, and blasphemy
regulation. A revised conception of the role of the state as facilitator,
rather than regulator, began to emerge in some respects.
The conception of state as facilitator speaks powerfully to the
appropriate attitude toward hate speech regulation in the 21st century.
This same approach will yield successful results in this area. Although
absolute libertarianism is both impractical and irresponsible in light of
practical effects of some speech, a qualified libertarianism, which
accepts the need for government as facilitator to correct the excesses of
the market of ideas at the margin, would be an appropriate means of
implementation. This approach recognizes the demonstrable success of
this attitude toward the role of the state, and also alleviates some
concerns validly raised in modernist paternalism without accepting its
underlying assumptions. If diligently applied, it can serve as an example
for international export in the debate on the state's role in speech
regulation. The United States has a rich contribution to the global
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marketplace of ideas, and it should not hesitate to develop this
contribution and offer it to the community of nations.
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